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CRIMINAL LABELS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
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Abstract   
This article explores whether the presumption of innocence is compromised by State 
declarations that a person is other than innocent, but which are neither predicated on nor 
equivalent to a criminal conviction. The task ultimately is threefold: in a descriptive 
sense, to establish the existing parameters of the presumption, in particular tracing its 
incremental expansion by the European Court of Human Rights; secondly, to present a 
normative argument as to what I believe the presumption should further entail, drawing 
on its recent doctrinal extension but moving beyond this in certain respects; and then 
finally to ascertain whether any labels or declarations by the State either before or absent 
a finding of criminal liability are problematic as regards the presumption of innocence as 
I propose it should be construed, and what ought to be done about this.  
 
I. Introduction  
The conventional, contemporary understanding of the presumption of innocence as a 
principle of criminal law and procedure is that it embodies two elements, firstly 
prescribing that the State must bear the burden of proof in a criminal trial and secondly 
requiring that the guilt of the individual as regards a particular crime be proven beyond 
reasonable doubt. Such a construction generally is uncontroversial in common law legal 
doctrine and scholarship. Now, jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
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has extended this central protective notion to preclude expressions of suspicion by the 
courts after acquittal and also declarations of guilt by agents of the State prior to trial. 
Moreover, a brief reference by the European Court seems to intimate that the 
presumption of innocence may go further still, and perhaps may apply to other 
stigmatising actions by the State.
2
  
Various existing state practices, such as criminal accusation and prosecution, 
inclusion on ‘watch lists’, and publication of details of civil preventative orders, may be 
hard to reconcile with an expansive version of the presumption of innocence, on the basis 
that they involve the treatment as other than innocent of persons who have not been 
found to be criminally culpable. While it may first appear that these engage the 
presumption of innocence as defined in the European context, according to Article 6(2) of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) the presumption cannot apply unless 
and until the individual is charged, thereby excluding some actions from its scope.
3
 
Nonetheless, intuitively it seems that certain official actions and statements do not 
comport with the ethos underpinning the presumption, which includes protecting the 
individual against the coercive power of the State.
4
  
This article begins in section II by examining the steady extension of the reach of 
the presumption of innocence in the context of ECHR jurisprudence. Though we all may 
agree on the conventional core of the presumption and the reasons for its protection in the 
context of criminal procedure, in section III I posit and defend a new and broader reading 
premised on protecting the individual from State censure. Even under the wide-ranging 
European approach, the presumption does not accrue until an individual is charged with 
an offence; I propose an extension so as to protect individuals who are subject to State 
labelling but who have not been charged.  
While there is a rich literature on official treatment of the individual that 
ostensibly breaches the presumption of innocence, such as pre-trial detention,
5
 that is not 
the concern of this paper. My focus is narrower: here the emphasis is on official, 
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censuring statements that replace rather than precede the criminal trial or accompany the 
‘hard treatment’ of conviction. Instead of looking at treatment in terms of behaviour 
towards or consequences for the individual, this paper looks at what may be called ‘non-
material’6 matters, namely public declarations that induce belief in guilt, as a substitute 
for a criminal conviction.
7
 Though the State labels may be accompanied or reinforced 
later by coercive acts or consequences, here I seek to consider the labels only.    
Then, in section IV, numerous official actions that declare people to be other than 
innocent will be identified. By teasing out the intent behind and effects of these measures 
this paper seeks to construct a typology and thereby ascertain which, if any, of these are 
problematic as regards the extended presumption of innocence I propose. I use domestic 
case law to flesh out jurisprudentially the bones of a normative argument that the 
presumption is applicable in the context of certain State labels short of criminal trial or 
conviction. Ultimately, if accepted, this requires a reconsideration of the necessary 
standard of proof in certain instances.  
 
II. The presumption of innocence and its European expansion 
According to the oft-quoted dictum in Woolmington v DPP, the presumption of 
innocence requires the prosecution to bear the burden of proof in the criminal trial that 
the defendant is guilty of the offence charged.
8
 This placing of the onus on the State is 
underpinned by the imbalance of resources and power between the parties in the criminal 
process, and acknowledges the liberal conception of limited state intervention and 
individual autonomy. Though, strictly speaking, the presumption is silent as to the 
necessary standard of proof, many interpretations see it as encompassing that of ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’. This understanding is by no means necessary, and as Ashworth notes, 
it is possible to conceive of a presumption that placed a less onerous burden on the 
prosecution.
9
 Nonetheless, the rationale for requiring a demanding standard of proof lies 
in the need to avoid wrongful convictions, the disparity of resources and the unreliability 
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of fact-finding, objectives that also underpin the aspect of the presumption that places the 
burden on the State.
10
 Though a high standard of proof does not prescribe precisely how 
people should be treated, a primary reason for this second element of the presumption is 
to guard against illegitimate convictions, given that the condemnation and punishment of 
an innocent person is deemed to cause more harm than the avoidance of liability by a 
guilty person. Essentially, this aspect of the presumption of innocence seeks to reduce the 
likelihood and potential cost of error as regards wrongful conviction in the criminal 
trial.
11
  
 In the United States the presumption of innocence is read into the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution, and has been described not as a presumption ‘in the 
strict sense of the term [but]… simply a rule of evidence which allows the defendant to 
stand mute at trial and places the burden upon the government to prove the charges 
against him beyond reasonable doubt.’12 The presumption does not apply to pre-trial 
proceedings in the US but rather ‘allocates the burden of proof in criminal trials; it also 
may serve as an admonishment to the jury to judge an accused’s guilt or innocence solely 
on the evidence adduced at trial and not on the basis of suspicions.’13 The presumption 
thereby places the onus on the State to prove a case and ultimately is addressed to the 
finder of fact, whether that is the jury or a professional judge. 
Such a narrow reading forms the relatively uncontroversial heart of the 
presumption across common law jurisdictions, but more expansive procedural 
understandings have been posited, mostly in academic literature, but now also by the 
European Court of Human Rights. Overall, the key interpretive question regarding the 
presumption concerns the stage of the process at which it applies, because this indicates 
the persons to whom it accrues and the State agents it binds. As Ashworth notes, its scope 
and meaning are ‘eminently contestable’ given that it may operate at the level of the 
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criminal trial only or in the criminal process more broadly.
14
 In its conventional and least 
challenged form, the presumption is a procedural safeguard relevant only at trial, 
guarding against conviction if the prosecution has not proved the alleged offence to the 
requisite standard. Thus, it has no applicability before the criminal trial commences. At 
the opposite end of the scale, it may be regarded as applying at the pre-trial stage more 
broadly and as prohibiting all restrictions on the accused’s liberty based on a view that 
she has a high risk of offending or disappearing,
15
 or as precluding coercive measures by 
the State against the individual.
16
 Furthermore, and more contentiously, the presumption 
of innocence has been conceived of as substantive in nature, and as prohibiting 
conviction where the person’s conduct is of the kind that ought not to be criminal.17 
In ECHR jurisprudence, the presumption of innocence as a procedural rule is 
interpreted in an increasingly generous fashion, and, of course, any development in 
European doctrine has ramifications for the traditional conception of the presumption in 
England and Wales, given the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998.
18
 Article 6(2) of 
the ECHR provides that ‘[e]veryone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law’ and so a court ‘should not start with the 
preconceived idea that the accused has committed the offence charged; the burden of 
proof is on the prosecution, and any doubt should benefit the accused.’19 Moreover, ‘pre-
trial procedures should be conducted, so far as possible, as if the defendant were 
innocent’.20 Beyond this, the European Court has found the presumption to encompass 
what has been called a ‘reputational’ aspect, which aims to protect the image of the 
person
21
 but also to defend him against the power of the State.
22
 Lord Phillips in the 
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Supreme Court described this development as the expansion of a component of the 
guarantee of a fair trial into ‘something coming close to a principle of the law of 
defamation’, and regarded this as a ‘remarkable’ example of the Convention’s nature as a 
‘living instrument’.23 
As Trechsel observes, complex problems surround the application of this 
interpretation of the presumption of innocence.
24
 Nevertheless, ECHR case law has 
delineated a number of rules in this respect. Article 6(2) will be breached by judicial 
decisions or reasoning reflecting an opinion that an unconvicted person is guilty, such as 
orders requiring him to pay the cost of criminal proceedings and compensation, or 
statements that had a prosecution not been time-barred it would ‘very probably have led 
to … conviction’.25  Moreover, the presumption is infringed where a court expresses 
suspicion about an acquitted individual (rather than opining that he is guilty), such as by 
refusing compensation to him or by saying that suspicion has not been ‘dispelled’.26 
Refusing to grant a cost order to a person who was acquitted after a key prosecution 
witness failed to show at trial was found to breach the presumption also.
27
 Furthermore, 
Article 6(2) was deemed to be contravened by a confiscation order that included the 
benefit derived from all the offences with which the individual had been charged, even 
those of which he had been acquitted.
28
 Overall, ‘one of the functions of Article 6 § 2 is 
to protect an acquitted person’s reputation from statements or acts that follow an acquittal 
which would seem to undermine it’;29 however ‘[t]he voicing of suspicions regarding an 
accused’s innocence is conceivable as long as the conclusion of criminal proceedings has 
not resulted in a decision on the merits of the accusation.’30  In other words, where 
criminal proceedings are discontinued, statements describing a state of suspicion, as 
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opposed to those expressing a determination of guilt, are not incompatible with the 
presumption.
31
   
ECHR jurisprudence indicates that State actors other than judges may breach 
Article 6(2). In Allenet de Ribemont v France, statements made by the Minister of the 
Interior and senior police officers implicated the applicant in a murder, after his arrest but 
before trial.
32
 This was ‘clearly a declaration of the applicant’s guilt which, firstly, 
encouraged the public to believe him guilty and, secondly, prejudged the assessment of 
the facts by the competent judicial authority’.33 So, a pronouncement as to culpability by 
agents of the State transgressed the presumption, as it encouraged his fellow citizens to 
regard him as guilty and usurped the role of the judiciary.
34
 There does not appear to be a 
requirement to prove intent on the part of the State, but here there is a degree of 
foreseeability regarding the likely effect of the declaration. Similarly, pre-trial comments 
by a prosecutor and senior staff regarding the ‘crimes’ and ‘personal qualities’ of the 
particular applicants, including their ‘cruelty and meaningless brutality’, ‘amounted to a 
declaration of the applicants’ guilt and prejudged the assessment of the facts by the 
competent judicial authority’.35   
Notwithstanding this stretching of Article 6(2) to encompass both court 
scepticism regarding the innocence of an acquitted individual, and the ‘prejudging’ of 
guilt by other State agents, the European Court has highlighted that the presumption of 
innocence is not breached where a prosecutor makes statements about the guilt of an 
accused person ‘in the course of a reasoned decision at a preliminary stage of those 
proceedings, rejecting the applicant’s request to discontinue the prosecution’. 36  In 
Daktaras v Lithuania, the applicant was given access to his case file and requested the 
prosecution be discontinued due to lack of evidence of his guilt. His request was 
dismissed, and the reasons of the prosecutor stated that his guilt had been ‘proved’, based 
on the evidence. Though the European Court regretted the use of the term ‘proved’, it 
held that the prosecutor (and indeed the applicant himself) had been concerned with 
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whether the case file involved sufficient evidence of guilt to justify proceeding to trial, 
and that these comments were not made in a context independent of the criminal 
proceedings, such as in a press conference.
37
 So, while it may be difficult to reconcile this 
case with the earlier jurisprudence, what seemed to be relevant to the Court’s decision 
were the context in which the statement was made, the nature of it, and its dissemination 
(or lack thereof). Moreover, the European Court has noted that there is a fundamental 
distinction between statements that someone is suspected of having committed a crime on 
the one hand, and clear declarations in the absence of a final conviction that an individual 
has committed the crime in question, on the other.
38
 
 Furthermore, the European Court remarked on the presumption in a more oblique 
fashion in S and Marper v UK, a case centring on the pre-trial collection and retention of 
DNA samples.
39
 There, the Court briefly made reference to the notion of stigmatisation, 
as distinct from a declaration of guilt or expression of suspicion, in relation to criminal 
suspects. This case concerned S, an acquitted child, and Marper, an adult against whom 
proceedings were not initiated, who had sought judicial review of the decision of the 
English police to collect their DNA at arrest and then to retain the samples, despite the 
fact that neither individual had been convicted.
40
 The Grand Chamber held that such 
‘blanket and indiscriminate’ retention of DNA violated the Article 8 right to privacy.41 It 
favoured limiting retention of DNA samples to a defined period of time and in relation to 
serious suspected offences only.
42
 In addition to framing their objection in terms of the 
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right to privacy, the applicants in S and Marper had claimed that the retention of DNA in 
databases cast suspicion on unconvicted persons and implied that they were not ‘wholly 
innocent’.43 Though ultimately the judgment centred on Article 8, the Grand Chamber 
acknowledged the ‘perception’ of the applicants ‘that they are not being treated as 
innocent’.44 Moreover, the Chamber referred to the ‘stigmatization’ in state storage of 
innocent persons’ DNA in the same manner as convicted individuals. 45  The UK 
Government had argued that there was no stigma in DNA retention as there was no 
public articulation of suspicion;
46
 though the Grand Chamber did not agree 
unequivocally, it concurred that ‘the retention of the applicants’ private data cannot be 
equated with the voicing of suspicions’.47 While this distinction was not explored in the 
judgment, the absence of express communication of the fact of DNA retention seems to 
differentiate it from situations like in Allenet de Ribemont involving police statements at 
press conferences, and thus seems to exclude such State behaviour from the scope of the 
presumption of innocence as legally defined, even by the wide-ranging approach of the 
European Court. Indeed, Article 6 is not referred to expressly in the judgment in S and 
Marper, and the reference to stigma is not teased out adequately nor is the concept’s 
relationship to the presumption of innocence explored.  
 One could speculate that the Grand Chamber held an instinctive aversion towards 
non-conviction DNA retention, not only in respect of privacy but also in terms of the 
presumption of innocence, yet could not fit this sentiment into extant jurisprudence. 
Essentially, the Court seemed to have some sympathy for the view that while non-
conviction DNA retention is not, strictly speaking, a declaration of guilt, nor does it 
constitute an expression of suspicion following acquittal, it denotes a degree of distrust 
on the part of State agents as to the future criminality of the person and her likelihood of 
re-offending, and thus seems to relate to the presumption of innocence loosely 
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speaking.
48
 Nevertheless, this was not examined by the Court explicitly and thus does 
little to advance the debate regarding the parameters of the presumption.  
As this outline of ECHR case law indicates, the presumption of innocence has 
been extended beyond its boundaries as traditionally accepted in the common law to 
constitute a broader protective device; however it remains limited to persons charged 
with an offence, and it precludes certain forms of State declarations only. In addition to 
these cases pertaining to the criminal justice process, the European Court views Article 
6(2) as relevant in the balancing exercise relating to the right to freedom of expression 
under Article 10.
49
 The presumption has been taken into account by the Court in cases 
where an individual’s reputation was at stake as a result of newspapers publishing 
allegations of criminal acts without substantiation and without the possibility of 
rebuttal.
50
 Similarly, in Constantinescu v Romania the Court deemed the presumption to 
be relevant as regards freedom of expression after a representative from a workers’ union 
used a term denoting guilt to describe some colleagues.
51
 Thus, the presumption of 
innocence, in the European doctrinal context, is also a norm to be taken into the balance 
when determining whether limitations on freedom of expression are justified and 
proportionate. This broader and arguably more nebulous view of the presumption takes it 
to govern the relations between individuals. In other words, in this respect it has 
horizontal effect and relates to the behaviour of the media and individual persons, rather 
than agents and bodies of the State only.  
 
III. The reach of the presumption – a normative proposal  
                                                             
48
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50
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51
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Where State agents describe a person as suspect, as problematic, as risky, or as criminal, 
an official view is being conveyed that separates her from the ‘law-abiding’ majority. 
Such labels may be imposed through criminal accusation and prosecution, by means of 
inclusion on ‘watch lists’, or through the publication of details of civil preventative orders 
like anti-social behaviour orders, for example. Though public preconceptions about 
individuals who come in contact with the justice system may be unavoidable, as Husak 
has said ‘it is one thing to have such feelings, and quite another to express them through 
an institution’.52   
Some of these State practices suggest that we may need to reframe our perception 
of liability: rather than the dyad of culpability that is thought to attach to the criminal 
process, in fact there seems to be a continuum ranging from innocent through to guilt in 
relation to suspected criminal behaviour, with interim positions involving State 
expressions of suspicion and ascriptions of blame. This may imply that some of the 
traditional protections that relate to the criminal trial, strictly speaking, are valuable or 
necessary in a wider context. The presumption cannot, however, be engaged, still less 
breached, by such statements if we conceive of it as a purely procedural device that 
relates to the trial only. Thus, it may be necessary to justify a more expansive reading of 
the presumption than is accepted currently, in terms of its relevance beyond the criminal 
trial and so ultimately to expand the people who may avail of its protection. Furthermore, 
I must defend relying on it over alternative individual rights. 
 
a. The purposes of the presumption  
 
We are all likely to agree on the presumption’s traditional scope and the reasons for its 
significance in the context of the criminal trial. While extending its protections outside of 
this setting by definition requires us to view the presumption as more than a procedural 
constraint, I argue that this remains in keeping with its purposes.  
There are various rationales for the presumption, centring on the protection of the 
individual from the coercive power of the State and the avoidance of erroneous 
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convictions, through to policy concerns about maintaining the legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system.
53
 Dennis describes these as the presumption’s epistemic and non-
epistemic values:
 
while the former dimension requires the prosecution to prove the 
allegation against the accused, the latter gives effect to a person’s claim to fair treatment 
by the State and to the principle that a liberal polity should treat its citizens as law-
abiding until it proves otherwise.
 54 
 
Drawing on both the epistemic and non-epistemic dimensions of the presumption, 
I suggest that its protections should apply to determinations of facts by the State in a 
manner that declares responsibility for criminal behaviour, even if this occurs outside the 
criminal trial. Epistemically, the uncontested core of the presumption in the criminal trial 
requires us to exercise caution as regards establishing evidence to a certain level of proof, 
due to the particular moral harm in a criminal conviction.
55
 Here, the presumption guards 
against illegitimate conviction and the consequent punishment, which involves the 
imposition of deprivation or hard treatment on a person because he has committed a 
wrong in a way that expresses disapprobation for the conduct.
56
 The former ‘hard 
treatment’ may take the shape of imprisonment, community service or a financial penalty. 
The latter element, censure, is the expression of a judgment that a person has acted in a 
reprehensible manner and the attendant sentiment of disapproval; this reprobationary 
function distinguishes a tax from a fine.
57
 Unlike denunciation, which concerns a particular 
act, censure is directed to the individual specifically and conveys to her that she has 
something to answer for in a moral way.
58
 Given the implications for the rights of the 
individual, the presumption prevents the imposition of such hard treatment and censure, 
unless the prosecution proves guilt to the requisite high level. The potential consequences 
therefore influence both the placing of the burden and the requisite standard of proof, 
explaining why in civil cases a lesser standard suffices.  
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As well as seeking to prevent wrongful convictions, the presumption as a 
procedural rule has non-epistemic importance. It is grounded in general values of 
political morality,
59
 deriving from but also preserving and concretising the trust and 
respect between the State and its citizens.
60
 Moreover, the presumption can be seen as 
part of what has been called the ‘principle of civility’,61 demonstrating our commitment 
to a sense of community and respect for fellow members.
62
 If we consider the trial 
process and criminal conviction as involving a communicative dimension,
63
 then we can 
view the constituent rights as involving an expressive component, as well as serving 
deontological ends. In this way, we can consider the presumption as being directed at 
more than the immediate adjudicator, and as conveying to the citizenry that an individual 
may be depicted and censured openly as criminal only with proof to the requisite level.  
Drawing from these insights, I wish to move beyond viewing the presumption as a 
procedural rule of the criminal trial on the one hand and a mere rhetorical aim on the 
other. Here, I argue that the presumption as a legal rule is relevant to State determinations 
about contested facts that speak to a person’s criminal responsibility. The interests at the 
heart of my concern are those protected by the presumption in its traditional form: 
namely trust in and respect for the person, and protection from the State. Here I seek to 
use these values to underpin my proposed mechanism in concrete terms, to permit the 
presumption to be used an analytical tool and also as a reminder of the appropriate 
standard of proof in processes of determinations about criminality, regardless of whether 
this happens outside of  the criminal trial. 
The incremental extension of the presumption proposed here centres not on 
reputation as Trechsel states in relation to ECHR case law,
64
 but on the appropriate 
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relationship between the State and the individual. Reputation may be defined as the 
general estimation in which the public holds a person,
65
 and in the context of Art 8, the 
right to reputation has been described as ‘part of … personal identity and psychological 
integrity’.66 Framing the extension of the presumption in this way with the focus on 
reputation leads to attention being placed on the effect on the individual, rather than 
looking specifically at the wrong in the State declaring a person to be something or to 
possess certain qualities. Ultimately my suggested interpretation of the presumption seeks 
to prevent the State from castigating someone as criminal before a finding of guilt and 
without a certain level of proof. 
Though in S and Marper the European Court referred to the ‘stigmatisation’ of 
people who are treated as not ‘wholly innocent’,67 this does not advance the current 
argument about the reach of the presumption. While stigma is a valuable sociological 
concept
68
 and may be regarded as one factor separating criminal law from other forms of 
state coercion,
69
 not every offence entails stigma.
70
 Moreover, stigma is generated in and 
by the community and does not speak to the State’s acts per se. Thus, stigma is neither a 
sufficient nor decisive component of a criminal offence, and so its presence or the 
likelihood of its generation does not demand the protections of the presumption without 
more. 
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It may be argued that extension beyond its traditional procedural parameters 
makes the presumption do too much, as it were, and thus risks diluting its potency. The 
danger of extending the presumption in the context of the criminal trial is that it may 
overshadow or supersede cognate rights like the right to silence, making it more likely 
that they could be balanced away.
71
 Here I accept the need to restrain the presumption’s 
scope in the context of the trial itself and do not call for it to encompass other dimensions 
of the right to a fair trial. The more pressing objection in the present context is that a 
broader interpretation may eclipse the normative value of the narrower procedural 
protection,
72
 and turn the presumption into a ‘vaporous euphemism for fairness in the 
administration of criminal justice’.73  
Certainly, profligate use of the presumption as a nebulous aspiration or a policy 
directive
74
 risks undermining its concrete protections in terms of criminal procedure. 
Nonetheless, I suggest that the presumption is apposite both as an interpretive lens and a 
justiciable right in the context of expressions of suspicion by agents of the State regarding 
the individual,
75
 and that this perspective need not compromise its core status as a 
procedural right. My suggested use is not to imply that the presumption necessarily is 
infringed by any such declarations but that it provides a valuable means of framing the 
debate about and highlighting potential problems with certain methods of crime control. 
If we first grant its heuristic value, we can later move to consider whether the 
presumption as a legal safeguard beyond the criminal trial is breached and if so whether 
this could be remedied by amendment of the standard of proof. In this instance, the 
presumption can regulate the devising of legislation that involves the ascription of 
liability in a way that involves censure, and it also constitutes a justiciable right for the 
affected individuals who are labelled as criminal on the basis of the civil standard of 
proof.  
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The rights to privacy, to dignity and equality do similar work to the presumption 
in this context, and may seem more apposite given the concerns previously mentioned. It 
is true that Article 8 concerns the way the State engages with and treats its citizens, but 
focusing on the private life of the individual neglects the core problem with certain 
official statements that involve a particular public portrayal of the individual.
76
 Only the 
presumption captures the essence of this particular wrong against the person and the 
expression of the statement that depicts a person in a certain manner. Similarly, the right 
to equality remains focused on consequences rather than on expression.
77
 In essence what 
is advocated here is the applicability of the presumption when the individual is liable to 
be described in a censuring way by the State. Relying on the presumption in this way 
shines a light on the core of the wrong, and in turn pushes us towards an appropriate 
standard of proof.  
 
b. The scope of the presumption  
As a matter of doctrine, an individual cannot enjoy the protection of the presumption in 
the European context if she has not been charged; Article 6(2) is explicit about this.
78
 
Nonetheless, Trechsel questions the necessity of this limitation, contending that the 
presumption should accrue to ‘everyone’, regardless of her involvement or otherwise in 
the criminal process.
79
 Indeed, under Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights ‘every individual’ has the right to be presumed innocent until proved 
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guilty by a competent court or tribunal.
80
 Moreover, while there are no cases centring on 
Article 6 where the European Court viewed the presumption as applying to those not yet 
charged, as noted, jurisprudence on Article 10 views the presumption as relevant to the 
balancing of the right to freedom of expression.
81
  
The risk of such extension, so that the presumption protects ‘everyone’, is that it 
could conflate a credal or factual conception of the presumption with the adjudicative or 
deliberative one. As Roberts reminds us, the presumption is not credal as it does not 
relate to belief but rather is a deliberative standard.
82
 Of course, the presumption entails 
the treatment of someone as legally rather than factually innocent, a distinction made 
more generally by Packer.
83
 Treating someone as factually innocent means just that, 
namely, presuming that he has not committed a crime. Though one may choose 
personally in a moral or ethical sense to view fellow citizens in this way, the presumption 
as a legal rule is not predicated on such an understanding. It is trite to say that the 
presumption does not prevent us (be that as citizens or even officials of the State) from 
believing someone to be factually guilt, but rather requires the State and its agents to 
adjudicate when all the while presuming her innocence. For these reasons I do not 
suggest an extension of the presumption to everyone as such, but to any person whose 
liability is determined by the State, even beyond the criminal trial. 
When the State accuses, arrests or charges someone, when it includes someone in 
a ‘watch list’, or when it publicises details of a civil preventative order, it seems that the 
State is expressing or declaring something both to and about that person. In the first 
instance, it may be argued that the person is ‘not being treated as innocent’84: in other 
words, an agent of the State is likely to believe her to be other than innocent, and acts 
towards her in an official way based on that belief. Nonetheless, as is explored in more 
detail below, this has no relevance to the presumption of innocence, in any of its guises. 
What the European Court has found to be problematic are court expressions of suspicion 
after acquittal, and also State declarations of guilt that encourage the community to view 
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her as guilty and arrogate the appropriate judicial role. Moving beyond this second 
conception, I argue that the presumption ought to apply to individuals who have not been 
charged but who are dealt with by the State in a quasi-criminal fashion. If the State seems 
to be using the civil process to circumvent the criminal trial, this may suggest that the 
requisite standard of proof may need to be re-examined. The relevance of the 
presumption here affects the standard of proof required for establishing liability and 
implies that the balance of probabilities should be reconsidered in relation to certain 
official labels. Though the absence of ‘hard treatment’ implies that proof beyond 
reasonable doubt is too onerous a standard, I suggest that at least ‘clear and convincing 
evidence’ ought be required when the presumption is affected in these contexts.85   
 
IV. A typology of State practices – gradations of suspicion 
 
This paper now focuses on a series of expressions of belief and official labels like that of 
‘suspicious’,  ‘risky’, ‘dangerous’, or ‘criminal’, and it examines whether the attribution 
of such labels by the State before or without conviction and on the civil standard of proof 
contravenes the previously outlined concept of the presumption of innocence. The 
jurisprudence of the European Court suggests that the presumption is breached where an 
agent of the State expresses a view on a charged person’s culpability so as encourage the 
public to believe him to be guilty and where there is a prejudgment of the assessment of 
the facts by any competent judicial authority.
86
 Drawing on this, the distinct normative 
argument put forward is that when the State ascribes a label of criminal to a person while 
circumventing the usual trial process, the presumption and its underpinning values 
require more than proof on the balance of probabilities. Given that the official label may 
not be accompanied by hard treatment, I refrain from calling for proof beyond reasonable 
doubt in such circumstances. Nonetheless, I suggest that the civil standard of proof is too 
easy a threshold for the State to surmount before publically depicting and categorising 
citizens in certain ways.  
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To illuminate the previous conceptual argument, I now turn to look at a range of 
pre-trial measures and civil orders that, ostensibly, seem to breach the presumption of 
innocence. In doing so I devise a typology to ascertain what a particular label expresses 
and on this basis I conclude if the presumption is relevant in fact to any of these given 
situations. At one end of the spectrum lie State expressions of suspicion regarding factual 
innocence, which may lead to a perception on the part of the person that she is not being 
treated as innocent and which may entail stigma but where there is no State declaration 
regarding criminal liability. The next type of label concerns State practices that may lead to 
a perception of being treated as other than innocent, where stigma may accrue, and where 
there is an official expression of belief regarding criminal propensity. It will be posited that 
while both types of label may be dubious broadly speaking, only the latter engages the 
presumption of innocence as it is construed here. Next, the paper considers situations where 
the State declares a view about the person which encourages the public to believe her to be 
equivalent to a criminal, but where this occurs in the civil context rather than being 
predicated on an assessment of the facts by a criminal court. It will be argued that such 
practices engage the presumption, and require reliance on more than the civil standard of 
proof.  
 
a. Expressions of suspicion  
 
Where a person is arrested or charged, where she is searched, detained and accused, and 
where information relating to her is retained after such State intervention, she has been 
distinguished in a certain way and thus is not being treated as innocent. As Lacey et al 
noted, widespread institutional and social practices like the treatment of suspects at police 
stations and prejudicial reporting by the media ‘sit unhappily’ with the presumption of 
innocence; nonetheless these practices ‘do not threaten to displace it, and rarely even call 
forth critical comment’.87 This observation highlights the apparent tension that exists 
between overt State intrusion in a person’s life based on suspicion, and the individual’s 
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right to be presumed innocent. Nevertheless, it will be argued that these actions do not 
breach the presumption. 
Arrestees, through search, detention and interrogation, and people detained under 
mental health legislation, for example, experience coercive treatment at the hands of the 
State and this differentiates them from people who are not suspected of a crime or of 
other behaviours. This perception may be compounded by community stigma relating to 
accusations for certain offences, to ‘unresolved accusation[s] of wrongdoing’,88 or even 
mere involvement in criminal justice system.
89
 As a result, it has been argued that ‘the 
collateral damage inflicted by publicity following charge’, especially in less serious 
cases, warrants anonymity in certain instances as a means of protecting the ‘vulnerable 
suspect’.90 More radically, calls have been made for the anonymity of all arrestees before 
charge,
91
 and for rape defendants specifically on the basis that a distinct stigma accrues in 
such instances.
92
 
Charging an individual indicates that both the police and the prosecuting agency 
believe on reasonable grounds that she has a case to answer. The arresting officer must 
consider there to be reasonable suspicion about her behaviour, as otherwise the State would 
not be entitled to intrude in her life.
93
 The officer’s suspicions may mean that he or she 
views the individual as other than factually innocent, but this does not necessarily involve 
regarding her as legally guilty and so obviously it does not encroach on her legal innocence. 
Thus, such actions of the police do not infringe the presumption, given the distinction 
between factual and legal innocence, and its deliberative or adjudicative rather than credal 
nature.  
Concerns about the presumption in relation to arrest are grounded on the notion 
that the public will conclude that an arrested individual is actually guilty, that there is no 
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smoke without fire, so to speak.
94
 While Lord Rodger in the Supreme Court asserted that 
the public is ‘more than capable of drawing the distinction between mere suspicion and 
sufficient evidence to prove guilt’,95 this seems to ascribe an undue degree of subtlety and 
thoughtfulness to popular discourse on suspects and crime, especially given the nature 
and tenor of some media coverage.
96
 It is plausible that a significant proportion of the 
public extrapolates that arrest is a likely judgment of guilt.  
Nevertheless, while the experience surrounding arrest can be unpleasant, 
undoubtedly is coercive, and may be associated with community stigma, such official 
treatment does not constitute punishment for a given act, nor is a person’s guilt being 
determined. Public belief or distrust is not sufficient for the presumption to be engaged, 
even if this is prompted by State intervention. What is critical in this respect is that which 
is being generated or expressed in an official way. At this juncture the State and its 
agents, namely the police and prosecutors, articulate suspicion about criminality, but are 
not expressing belief regarding criminal liability in such a way as to induce public belief of 
guilt, nor do such actions constitute a ‘prejudging’ of the facts, to use the language of the 
European court.  
Moreover, though pre-trial publicity may in fact impinge on the right to privacy of 
a person, it cannot be seen as dubious in terms of the presumption of innocence, even in 
the broader sense advocated in this paper. As Antony Duff has said, to summon a 
defendant to trial is to address and treat her as a fellow citizen.
97
 Arrest and then criminal 
charge begin a process where the State calls someone to account in relation to an alleged 
past act and treats her as a rational member of the polity, but does not give a 
determination as to her culpability. While we may feel unease at pre-trial publicity 
regarding a suspect, and though defendants may be branded through court appearance 
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and media reporting of trials, the proper administration of justice and the rule of law 
warrant public judicial processes, generally speaking. Moreover, I argue, contrary to 
ECHR case law, that media speculation as to criminal liability must be distinguished 
from State declarations of guilt. The former is not unproblematic as a potential civil 
wrong between two individual or private parties; however the presumption of innocence 
relates to the State/individual relationship and is a part of the counterweight that mitigates 
the inherent imbalance of power in this respect. Though media depiction may be 
egregious in terms of the effect on the person and the gravity of the declaration to the 
public and may sometimes exceed the impact of State labelling, it is of a different quality 
because of the parties involved.  
Whether State omissions in this context may lead indirectly to labels of judgment 
that breach the presumption is more contentious. Where the State fails to act after a 
private party castigates an individual for a ‘crime’, it may appear that this represents 
official acquiescence, as the person is labelled without a finding of guilt. Nonetheless, 
this really speaks to the person’s reputation rather than constituting an express State 
declaration as to liability, and so is excluded from the reach of the presumption as 
advocated here. 
  
b. Stigmatising expressions regarding criminal propensity  
The next type of labels may be regarded as encompassing the State’s belief about a person’s 
potential behaviour. The retention of DNA, the use of enhanced criminal records checks, 
and the creation of ‘watch lists’ treat the individual as less than innocent in a way that may 
sometimes be stigmatising, but it is questionable as to whether these constitute declarations 
of guilt as such. Thus, while the presumption may shed light in analysing these measures, it 
is less clear whether it is breached.  
As regards the retention of DNA in databases, the applicants in S and Marper 
claimed that this cast suspicion on unconvicted persons and implied that they were not 
‘wholly innocent’.98 In contrast to the Court of Appeal, which asserted that a police 
constable could destroy DNA evidence if the person were free from ‘any taint of 
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suspicion’,99 the European Court expressed its concern that unconvicted persons, who 
‘are entitled to the presumption of innocence, are treated in the same way as convicted 
persons’.100 The treatment of these distinct cohorts in an equivalent manner does not 
imply a view as to factual or legal guilt of those yet to be convicted but encapsulates the 
State’s opinion of such persons as more risky than the rest of the population. The State is 
not judging guilt but rather speculating as to propensity; moreover, there is no publicity 
of the fact of retention, and genetic material usually is stored in code form that may be 
read with expertise only.
101
 Thus any stigma is felt in a subjective manner only, and there 
is no cultivation of community condemnation. So, while a person whose DNA is retained 
rightly may feel singled out as not ‘wholly innocent’, the State is expressing concern 
about risk rather than declaring guilt, and given that inclusion is not publicised, the 
State’s action does not encourage the public to view her in a particular manner. This 
suggests that a DNA database including unconvicted individuals does not compromise 
the presumption of innocence.  
Of course, as well as retaining DNA in limited instances, the police keep arrest 
records more generally, on the basis that a previous arrest might provide a lead to solving 
a current case.
102
 The reasons a person was arrested but not prosecuted may range from a 
lack of evidence, through non-cooperation of witnesses to the person’s intimidation of 
such witnesses, the fact that the arrest was grounded on harassment or other improper 
police conduct, and so on.
103
 There is a qualitative difference between these cases, yet all 
lead to the same result, that is, the creation of a criminal record. Though such a record 
appears to characterise the individual in a certain light and depict him as less than 
innocent, in actuality it is merely a factual account of criminal justice intervention, and 
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does not entail any declaration of guilt. The creation and maintenance of such records is a 
formal registration of official intervention in a person’s life based on State suspicion. 
What the State is expressing through arrest is a concern regarding suspected past 
behaviour, and the retention of records embodies an openness towards the possibility that 
the information may be of use to the State in future.  
Beyond this, the circulation of arrest records may lead to stigma, through the 
publication of the State’s suspicions. Such records are available to police and other State 
agencies, although after a certain period of time, depending on the gravity of the 
suspected offence and the age of the individual, they are ‘stepped down’ so as to be 
available to the police only.
104
 Nonetheless, non-conviction or ‘soft’ information 
contained in police records may continue to be made available as the result of ‘enhanced’ 
criminal record checks (through a process also known as enhanced disclosure),
105
 which 
are
 
carried out where people apply for certain positions, such as those involving 
interaction with children. In such situations an application for a record check is made by 
the individual, signed by her prospective employer, and the Secretary of State issues this 
after requesting the information from the chief officer of the police.
106
 So, while the 
person must consent to the check, she may not be aware of the content of her record. This 
reveals to an employer all conviction information, both spent and unspent, and crucially 
any non-conviction information viewed as relevant by the chief officer.
107
  
In R (L) v Metropolitan Police the UK Supreme Court examined the compatibility 
of enhanced criminal record checks with the ECHR, after certain past accusations against 
L had been disclosed in relation to her employment.
108
 L’s appeal against disclosure was 
dismissed, with argument centring on Article 8; thus the key element was the 
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proportionality of the checks made into the accusations.
109
 The Court held that the 
applicant should be given opportunity to make representations, not in all cases, but where 
there is room for doubt as to whether information that is considered to be relevant should 
be disclosed.
110
  
Viewing this case and enhanced criminal record checks generally through the lens 
of the presumption of innocence brings the true nature of the State action usefully to the 
fore. Not only is evidence regarding convictions relevant here, but accusations and other 
‘soft’ information may be disclosed. So, the fact that a person has been accused of a 
crime may feed into a decision as to whether to employ her in a certain role, implying 
that she is risky in some respect. Moreover, that initial accusation or other information 
may not be predicated or established to any particular standard of proof. In such an 
instance, the person is being treated as not ‘wholly innocent’ by the employer, and the 
State seems to acquiesce in this by permitting enhanced criminal record checks to affect 
the determination of suitability for a position of employment. Moreover, a chief police 
officer makes a determination as to relevancy, and then the information is issued by order 
of the Secretary of State, arguably not the appropriate authorities to determine such a 
matter. This suggests that the affected individual ought to be able to make representations 
in all such instances, so as to counterbalance the impact on her reputation and private life 
as protected by Article 8. Nevertheless, though some members of the public may be 
induced to view the person as risky through the information revealed in such a record 
check, the absence of any official expression as to guilt means that the presumption is not 
relevant in this instance. 
In a similar fashion, ‘watch lists’ exist in the UK, such as that governed by Part 
VII of the Care Standards Act 2000 which facilitated the placing of care workers in 
hospitals, nursing homes and residential care homes on a register of people considered 
unsuitable to work with vulnerable adults.
111
 To be included in the ‘Protection of 
Vulnerable Adults’ (POVA) list, the Secretary of State needed to be of the opinion that a 
particular care provider reasonably considered a worker to be guilty of misconduct that 
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has harmed or risked harming a vulnerable adult, and this is based on the civil standard of 
proof.  
Watch lists like this involve the labelling of a person in a particular manner and 
embody a determination about her previous ‘misconduct’ and also suspicion about her 
propensity to commit harmful behaviour. The ‘considerable’ stigma of inclusion on the 
POVA list was stressed by Baroness Hale in R (Wright) v Secretary of State for Health, 
on the basis that ‘[e]ven though the lists are not made public, the fact is likely to get 
about’.112 Moreover, inclusion may lead to certain consequences: this scheme may result 
in an individual losing her job and indeed the prospect of every having any job of that 
kind.
113
 In R (Wright) the House of Lords considered watch lists in relation to Article 
6(1), which entitles everyone to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal in the determination of his civil rights or criminal 
charge, as well as Article 8. A declaration of incompatibility with the former was found 
on the basis that the initiation of the process did not given the care worker a fair 
opportunity to answer the allegations ‘before imposing upon her possibly irreparable 
damage to her employment or prospects of employment’.114 Thus, the House of Lords 
concluded that the scheme could be remedied by permitting a possibility of countering 
the assertions against her. Indeed, this scheme has been replaced by the Safeguarding 
Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, which puts responsibility for determining inclusion on the 
‘barred list’ on the newly created Independent Barring Board, after reference from the 
Secretary of State.
115
 Critically, the particular individual now may make representations 
against this decision; nonetheless inclusion on the ‘barred list’ automatically precludes 
her from certain positions of employment.  
Though the primary intention behind the enactment of watch lists (insofar as 
legislative intent may be ascertained) is public protection, a likely side effect is 
stigmatisation through the conveyance of a warning to the community regarding the 
person, through the prohibition on her taking particular professional positions. This label 
certainly speaks to the State’s view of the danger or risks she may pose, but also 
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constitutes a declaration of guilt regarding previous ‘misconduct’. Ultimately, the 
analysis here indicates that these types of watch lists breach the presumption of 
innocence, given the determination regarding prior misconduct on the balance of 
probabilities and the likelihood of this being revealed and circulated. Though 
employment is affected, that is not the critical dimension rather it is the message that is 
being conveyed. The effect that watch lists have on the presumption of innocence has not 
been remedied by the new scheme introduced under the 2006 Act. In contrast, enhanced 
criminal record checks and other stigmatising expressions regarding criminal propensity 
do not engage the presumption of innocence, though they are problematic in other 
respects.  
 
c. Declarations of guilt regarding criminality   
The next category to be explored in this typology involves public labelling by agents of the 
State, which expresses a view on the person’s criminality in general rather than 
responsibility for a particular act. I suggest that the presumption is germane here given that 
these State classifications entail a communicative, communal condemnation of a wrong 
and a declaration regarding guilt.
116
 The relevance of the presumption of innocence 
indicates that proof on the balance of probabilities is not sufficient when the State ascribes 
the label of ‘criminal’ to a person. Nonetheless, given the absence of hard treatment the 
paper stops short of calling for proof beyond reasonable doubt in all such instances, and 
accepts that an intermediate standard like ‘clear and convincing evidence’ would suffice 
as a protective measure. 
The circulation of the details of anti-social behaviour orders fits into this class of 
declarations regarding criminality, as does the publicised imposition of control orders and 
civil recovery orders. As will be articulated below, these civil preventative orders seem of a 
different nature to measures like arrest and DNA retention. In this context not only can 
stigma accrue, but there is also an intention to label, to deter others from the particular 
behaviour through expression of suspicion regarding culpability, and to condemn the 
person’s pattern of behaviour or lifestyle. This constitutes a declaration of guilt, albeit in 
relation to criminality in general rather than one specific crime, based on the civil 
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standard of proof. Nonetheless, I argue that these issues are not irremediable, given that 
altering of the standard of proof and requiring anonymity would provide sufficient 
protection for the individual involved.  
Across the UK, a court may make a civil anti-social behaviour order (an ASBO) 
restricting the actions of a person who has been found responsible for anti-social 
behaviour, namely that which caused or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress.
117
 
As Ashworth notes, the use of civil law procedures circumvents the rights usually 
conferred on accused persons,
118
 thereby evading the presumption of innocence as a 
procedural rule.
119
 ASBOs are presented as regulatory rather than punitive measures and 
thus as not operating in the criminal realm.
120
 Even so, breach of the order is a criminal 
offence, punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. Though this means of 
criminalisation may be seen as objectionable, that is not the concern of this paper: the 
focus here is on public depiction and labelling through ASBOs.  
In England and Wales, local authorities and police forces distribute leaflets with 
pictures of people who are the subject of ASBOs, including children who may be as 
young as ten years old.
121
 Such a tactic was approved of in R (Stanley, Marshall and 
Kelly) v Metropolitan Police Commission,
122
 where ASBOs had been issued by the police 
and the local authority to a group of youths. Notice of these ASBOs was published in the 
press and on the authority’s website (which referred to them as ‘thugs’ and ‘bully boys’, 
and mentioned their ‘animalistic’ behaviour), and flyers with photos and personal details 
of the boys were circulated. The leaflet spoke of ‘keeping crime off the streets’, and 
stated that the claimants were part of a group that had committed identified offences.
123
 
The applicants sought judicial review of the decision to publicise the imposition of these 
                                                             
117
 Crime and Disorder Act 1998; Antisocial Behaviour etc. (Scotland) Act 2004. The ASBO may be 
replaced by a civil injunction called the Crime Prevention Injunction: see Home Office, Putting Victims 
First: More Effective Responses to Anti-Social Behaviour Cm 8367 (London: The Stationery Office, 2012). 
118
 Ashworth, n 9. 
119
 See K. Ferzan, ‘Prevention, Proof, and the Presumption of Innocence’, paper presented at Fraying the 
Golden Thread: The Presumption of Innocence in Contemporary Criminal Law, University of Minnesota, 
4-5 May 2012, regarding the ‘substantive priority question’, namely whether civil regimes run ‘afoul of the 
spirit of the PoI’, by circumventing the possibility of a criminal trial.  
120
 See A. Crawford ‘Governing through anti-social behaviour: regulatory challenges to criminal justice’ 
(2009) 49 British Journal of Criminology 810.   
121
 See P. Squires and D. Stephen ‘Rethinking ASBOs’ (2005) 25 Critical Social Policy 517, 523. 
122
 R (Stanley, Marshall and Kelly) v Metropolitan Police Commission, London Borough of Brent and 
Secretary of State for the Home Department (intervening) [2004] EWHC 2229 (Admin). 
123
 Ibid [23]. 
Comment [C13]: and anonymity, 
as was routinely the case with 
control orders and maybe also 
TPIMs 
 29 
ASBOs and a declaration that the publicity was in breach of Article 8. The High Court 
dismissed their claim, and stated that while publicity about ASBOs could infringe Article 
8 and thus the necessity and proportionality of the measures would need to be considered, 
in this instance there was no breach. The publicity was deemed to aid in enforcing and 
ensuring compliance with the order, and therefore such colourful language was seen as 
apposite.  
This paper seeks to reposition the consideration of this case and look at it through 
the lens of the presumption of innocence. Indeed, it is fruitful to recall the judgment in 
Khuzhin v Russia where pre-trial comments by the prosecution regarding the ‘crimes’ and 
‘personal qualities’ of the applicants were found to have breached the presumption of 
innocence.
124
 Given that the leaflet publicising these ASBOs was also framed in the 
language of crime, a direct parallel may be drawn. The only difference lies in the fact that 
the young people in R (Stanley, Marshall and Kelly) had not been charged. Though this is 
significant to be sure, as previously argued this is not insurmountable if our focus is on 
the principles behind the presumption.  
The imposition and subsequent publication of ASBOs involves State labelling and 
stereotyping, and empirical work shows subjective perceptions of stigmatisation: 
‘Notions of discriminatory policing and feelings of general stigmatization were 
entrenched among local young people; feelings which the intensification of policing and, 
potentially, the use of tools such as ASBOs … would serve to exacerbate.’ 125 
Nevertheless, this subjective interpretation is not relevant to the presumption of 
innocence. It is more difficult to establish the intention of the State in this respect. Cobb 
notes that what he calls ‘the ethopolitics of shame’ regarding ASBOs is denied by the 
government; however it is acknowledged and propounded by local authorities.
126
 Though 
the intention of the State’s legislative branch may be unclear, the deliberate publication of 
the fact of these orders, and the almost permanent record online, entrenches the stigma 
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and serves to ‘other’ 127  the individuals involved through a declaration regarding 
responsibility for criminal acts or problematic behaviour.  
Such State labelling of the individual through ASBOs does not equate to criminal 
punishment, either in terms of the substance of the label or the possible consequences – 
no hard treatment is involved, and the declaration does not denote a criminal conviction. 
Moreover, the agent of the State may not be declaring guilt as to one particular suspected 
act. Nonetheless, it is acting in a way as to induce a certain community view of the 
person, and to judge her in the absence of a criminal conviction. Notably, the House of 
Lords held that while ASBOs are civil orders a court must be satisfied to what is 
essentially the criminal standard of proof that anti-social behaviour took place.
128
 So, the 
alleged behaviour need not constitute a criminal act, but it must be proven beyond 
reasonable doubt to be anti-social behaviour. This is what Ferzan describes as ‘procedural 
symmetry’,129 where the standard of proof for what is strictly speaking a civil measure is 
elevated to the criminal one. This provides a careful threshold to surmount before an 
ASBO is imposed, and one could view the judgment in McCann as the House of Lords 
protecting the underlying ethos of the presumption of innocence by enforcing the higher 
standard of proof.  
More particularly, if the language of ‘crime’ is used explicitly in a given case, as 
in Stanley, Marshall and Kelly, and if such declarations are predicated on the civil 
standard of proof, then the presumption is breached. Again, any publically articulated 
official condemnation of an individual must be predicated on a high standard of proof. 
While clear and convincing evidence arguably could suffice, the approach required by the 
House of Lords is commendably cautious in its protection of the individual against the 
State.  
The use of ‘control orders’ against persons suspected of being involved in terrorist 
offences also is relevant in unpacking this extended version of the presumption. The 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 permitted a civil order to be made by the Secretary of 
State against an individual, restricting his liberty, association and/or employment so as to 
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protect the public from a risk of terrorism. The order could be made if the Secretary of 
State had reasonable grounds for suspecting that the individual is or has been involved in 
terrorism-related activity, and the High Court was required to approve this determination. 
Like ASBOs, breach of a control order is an offence. These orders have now been 
replaced by Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures,
130
 which are more limited 
in terms of the obligations that may be imposed but retain most features of control orders.  
It has been argued that such orders are punitive, given that the alleged activities 
that may give rise to them are mostly serious criminal offences; some of the 
consequences are as onerous as criminal punishment; and breach results in 
imprisonment.
131
 Zedner thus concludes that the civil standard of proof is not 
appropriate.
132
Though the problem with control orders lies primarily in their 
encroachment on the liberty of the individual, their imposition seems analogous to 
decisions about criminal liability and so the State label that is imposed is also relevant. 
While it may be argued that the determination here is akin to the situation with DNA 
databases, where there is a speculation as to propensity or a judgment of risk, in fact the 
Secretary of State must possess a certain belief as to past or present behaviour. So, 
control orders involve a determination as to responsibility. Accordingly, the presumption 
of innocence requires us to revisit the requisite standard of proof in this instance, given 
that person is being depicted as a terrorist without a criminal trial and on the balance of 
probabilities. Rather, proof ought to be established beyond reasonable doubt, or at the 
very least to a ‘clear and convincing’ degree, before such orders may be imposed. If the 
latter intermediate standard were adopted, anonymity would provide a further safeguard 
for the individual.  
The use of civil recovery orders is another tactic adopted by the State that entails 
a stigmatising declaration regarding criminal liability, and thereby engages the 
presumption of innocence.
133
 Such orders may be made against property worth at least 
£10,000 in the UK that is deemed to be the proceeds of crime, namely obtained through 
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unlawful conduct.
134
 The civil standard of proof is used here. It is not necessary for 
proceedings to have been brought for an offence in connection with the property,
135
 and 
property need not be related to a particular crime on the basis that this would make the 
scheme ‘useless and unworkable’. 136  In other words, there is no predicate offence. 
Indeed, the very rationale is to facilitate recovery of assets where a conviction and thus 
criminal confiscation is not possible, because of circumstances such as lack of 
evidence.
137
 
Domestic and European courts have found that such recovery of assets on the 
civil standard of proof is not a criminal matter attracting due process protections.
138
 In 
one respect, civil recovery may be viewed as preventative, as it ensures that illegal profits 
cannot be accumulated and used to fund criminality or corrupt democratic institutions. 
Another interpretation is that it seeks to redress an imbalance by seizing assets accrued as 
a result of criminal activity and therefore is reparative.
139
 I suggest that while the 
ostensible rationale is to recoup unlawfully acquired assets, and while these orders are 
directed at the property rather than the person, recovery also incorporates a substantial 
stigma
140
 and incorporates the blame that distinguishes criminal from civil measures, with 
the former connoting ‘should not do’.141 Certainly, moral responsibility and social blame 
accrue as a result of judicial determination that property represents the proceeds of 
crime.
142
 Civil recovery in fact places the label of criminal on a person without due 
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process protections: while the legislation refers to unlawful conduct, the assets seized are 
described as the ‘proceeds of crime’, both in relevant legislation and by the courts. This 
represents a declaration that encourages the public to believe the owner of the property to 
be guilty of criminality, broadly speaking. 
Civil asset forfeiture often follows acquittal, but the argument that the 
presumption of innocence thereby is breached has been raised unsuccessfully in the UK 
courts. In Director of the Assets Recovery Agency v Kean Stanley Burnton J emphasised 
that the respondent’s acquittal was not a reason to prevent the Assets Recovery Agency 
from relying on the evidence in question, given that his so-called ‘guilt’ could be proved 
on the balance of probabilities.
143
 This statement is troubling with respect to the 
presumption of innocence, given the judicial conflation of criminal notions of guilt and 
civil liability. Moreover, the UK Supreme Court, in the first civil recovery case it heard, 
held that the courts may consider evidence that formed the basis of charges abroad of 
which the appellant was acquitted,
144
 and that while this may represent an expression of 
suspicion by the State regarding his guilt this does not breach the presumption of 
innocence as it does not reflect a judicial opinion that a person is guilty. Similarly, the 
respondent in Scottish Ministers v Doig contended a breach of Article 6(2) on the basis 
that averments relating to a recovery order stated he was involved in the supply of 
controlled drugs although he had been acquitted of those charges.
145
 The Court of Session 
rejected his line of argument, stressing that recovery and criminal proceedings are 
entirely separate, and that the averments did not invite or assert a finding of guilt of a 
particular offence, but rather contended that the conduct was unlawful.
146
 This was found 
not to offend Article 6(2).  
As previously noted, the European Court has stressed that Article 6(2) seeks to 
safeguard an acquitted person’s reputation from statements or acts that would seem to 
undermine the acquittal.
147
 Viewing these cases in light of the presumption more broadly 
illuminates the State’s declaration of guilt in a way as to shape public opinion, regardless 
of the conclusion of the criminal courts, or indeed whether a trial will occur at all. While 
                                                             
143
 Director of the Assets Recovery Agency v Kean [2007] All ER (D) 286 [64]. 
144
 Gale v Serious Organised Crime Agency [2011] UKSC 49. 
145
 Scottish Ministers v Doig [2009] CSIH 34; 2009 SC 474. 
146
 Ibid [32]. 
147
 Taliadorou and Stylianou v Cyprus n 29 [26]. 
Comment [C15]: see now R v 
Varma [2012] UKSC 42. Does it add 
anything? 
Comment [LC16]: I don’t think so.  
The Supreme Court there held that 
the Crown Court may make a 
confiscation order against a 
defendant following conviction for 
an offence even if he or she receives 
an absolute or conditional discharge 
for that offence. The difference is 
that s/he has been convicted but the 
court did not impose punishment.  
Do you think a footnote outlining 
this is necessary?  
 34 
the State’s response would be that the aim is to remove funds after the perpetration of 
unlawful acts is established, the dissemination of a condemnatory opinion engages the 
presumption of innocence. So, rather than the reliance on evidence from an acquittal 
being problematic, I suggest that what is contentious here is the State declaration of guilt 
through the seizing of assets described as the proceeds of crime, but without proof 
beyond reasonable doubt. While the coercive tactic of seizing property itself is not 
unproblematic, the troubling issue in the context of this paper is the label and the 
publicity involved.  
Here the State is depicting a member of the polity to her fellow citizens as 
enjoying property generated through criminal behaviour. Given that the nuances of the 
standard of proof may be lost on the average person, the declaration is that the person is 
responsible for criminal acts. The policy implications of this insight are that in the 
context of asset forfeiture a higher standard of proof should be required, as occurs in 
relation to ASBOs. Having said this, the absence of hard treatment in the form of 
punishment per se implies that a ‘clear and convincing’ would suffice, rather than 
necessitating proof beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, the implications for the 
individual indicate that anonymity should be preserved.  
 
V. Conclusion 
Labels in the criminal justice system have a declaratory function; offences thus need to be 
named and classified appropriately.
148
 Similar caution and fairness is imperative in the 
official classification and naming of persons based on their actions, given the meaning it 
may express to fellow citizens. Such labels or measures may be desirable: there is a 
weighty consequentialist argument for stigmatising certain behaviours on the basis that 
this is beneficial to society in terms of deterrence and retribution.
149
 Nevertheless, 
ascribing the label of ‘criminal’ risks breaching the presumption of innocence and its 
underlying values, even when this occurs outside of the criminal process.  
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Moving from the traditional dichotomous conceptions of guilt and innocence, in 
this article I have drawn on an understanding of the criminal justice system that sees it as 
involving a continuum of culpability and associated labelling. Using the presumption as 
an interpretative device allows us to get to the core of what is troubling about certain 
State practices. Beyond this, I have presented an expanded interpretation of the 
presumption, one that takes in persons who have not been charged, and in doing so have 
drawn upon both its epistemic purposes and its broader significance in terms of the 
relations and trust between the State and its citizens.  
Building on this understanding, the paper has sought to determine whether certain 
expressions of suspicion through official labels or declarations of guilt engage or breach 
the presumption of innocence. At first blush, it might seem that attaching the label of 
arrestee, suspect, or accused to a person speaks to the State’s suspicion of his culpability 
or likelihood to offend, and thus distinguishes him from ‘truly’ innocent people who have 
never come to the attention of the police. By devising a typology focusing on censure, 
state intention and public dissemination, this paper concludes that while the unfortunate 
effect of some measures by the State may stigmatise a person, this is not in breach of the 
presumption of innocence. Rather, the presumption is compromised only where the 
declaration involves a public expression of censure on the balance of probabilities, given 
that such State action usurps the role of the criminal courts and evades the associated 
protections through the creation of a ‘shadow criminal law’.150 
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